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Part of this chapter relies on fieldwork supported by the ‘Master dei Talenti’ 
programme funded by the Department of Political Studies, University of 
Turin and Cassa di Risparmio di Torino (Italy). The identity of the individuals 
interviewed by the author has deliberately been kept anonymous. 
Introduction
Universities and student activism have proven to be central to Iranian 
politics. Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic, university 
students actively participated in the political life of the country, sometimes 
backing the ruling governments, sometimes violently contesting them. It 
is, however, important to remember that students organised in political 
associations and voiced opposition to the government well before the 
1979 revolution. Student opposition to the ruling powers in Iran goes 
back to the early twentieth century, with the student movement achieving 
international credibility and becoming the vanguard of opposition to 
the monarchy in the 1960s.1 Then as now, after the 2009 presidential 
election when the country was shaken by large demonstrations demanding 
fair elections, student protests have received extensive international 
attention. 
The notion of universities being centres of political activism and dissent is 
particularly pertinent in Iran given the history of the student movement’s 
opposition to the Shah and their subsequent resistance to the authoritarian 
developments of the Islamic Republic.2 
This chapter, however, seeks to qualify this view of students as naturally 
keen to engage in opposition and protests – although this is often true. 
It rather tries to investigate ‘the other side of the coin’, focusing on the 
continuity and linkage between student activism and state institutions, 
1.  See Afshin Matin-Asgari, 
Iranian Student Opposition 
to the Shah (Costa Mesa, 
CA: Mazda, 2001), 
passim, in particular 
chapters one and three.
2.  See Mehrdad Mashayekhi, 
‘The Revival of the 
Student Movement in 
Post-Revolutionary Iran’, 
International Journal of 
Politics, Culture and Society, 
vol. 15, no. 2, 2001; Behzad 
Yaghmaian, Social Change in 
Iran: An Eyewitness Account 
of Dissent, Defiance, and 
New Movements for Rights 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
2002). There is also a rich 
literature in Persian on 
this topic. See below in 
the text and, for example, 
Morad Saghafi, ‘Daneshjoo, 
Dowlat va Enqelab’ 
[‘Students, Government and 
Revolution’], Goftogu, no. 5, 
1994, pp. 9-26 and ‘Jarian-e 
Daneshjuian, chaleshha 
va rahkarha. Goftogu ba 
Ali Tajrania’ [‘Student 
movement, challenges and 
solutions. A discussion 
with Ali Tajrania’], 
Cheshmandaz-e Iran, no. 26, 
(1383/2004), pp. 107-11.
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going beyond the idea of university as an autonomous site of opposition 
against the state While it may be that universities are, as a site and 
system of higher education, the locus of dissent par excellence, they are 
also institutions where co-optation and social and professional identities 
are forged. Universities are the crucible where a sense of patriotism 
is instilled in students and the future political elite is educated and 
socialised into politics. This importance is reflected in the attention 
that governments give to universities: the campus is the first context 
of political education, where loyalties and political affiliations – which 
may have future implications beyond the campus – are established. 
The aim of this chapter is to highlight the connections between Iranian 
institutional politics and the university campus as a site for recruitment, 
political mobilisation and power distribution among the competing 
political factions of the Islamic Republic.
The chapter focuses on two main aspects. First, the interactions between 
the regime and student movements3 in terms of factionalism, political 
recruitment and power distribution: this perspective facilitates a deeper 
understanding of Iranian domestic politics. In addition, as many 
dissident students have fled the country due to the clampdown on 
political activity in the last few years, the potential influence that this 
diaspora can exert from abroad on the political situation in Iran is the 
second element that is taken into consideration. 
Universities are inherently political institutions, and their internal 
dynamics need to be understood in order to acquire a deeper insight 
into political developments in Iran: a study of the struggle for the control 
of an important cultural and economic resource for the Islamic state, 
as represented by universities, sheds substantial light on the factional 
struggles that are such a salient feature of Iranian politics. Furthermore, 
it provides a barometer of the state’s level of tolerance for freedom of 
speech and civil rights and also of the likelihood of change in the Islamic 
Republic – a scenario which may also be linked to the high number 
of activists living outside of the country. This chapter covers all these 
issues, attempting to provide an assessment of the current situation 
and some suggestions for the future.
Historical background: student politics 
and the revolution 
The student movement in Iran has deep historical roots. Since the 
establishment of the University of Tehran in 1934 by Reza Shah Pahlavi, 
universities have been an important arena where the regimes have 
tried to forge national identity and form an educated political élite and 
3.  Although Iranian 
universities are home to 
a large number of student 
organisations, which are 
quite ideologically diverse, 
for the purposes of this 
chapter the focus is on 
the main organisations. 
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where at the same time opposition movements have tried to mobilise 
support. During Reza Shah’s reign, the university population was both 
rather small and homogeneous, a situation which changed due to the 
opportunities ushered in by the political opening up that took place 
between 1941 and 1953.4 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah, had 
ambitious plans for the Iranian higher education sector. As he wanted 
Iran to become one of the most developed countries in the world, he 
needed well-prepared and educated technicians and intellectuals to 
lead such a process, and he therefore established more campuses and 
increased scholarships for studying abroad.5 Ironically this provided 
the anti-Shah students with the opportunity to meet and organise both 
domestically and abroad – where approximately 200,000 resided6 – to 
express their dissent despite the harsh repression.7 
Thus, when the revolution erupted in 1979, the universities were hotbeds 
of activism. A witness recalls that period as one in which various 
political groups established their headquarters on the campuses and 
universities became the most active political arena in society, to the point 
that the then government was afraid of losing control over the whole 
anti-Shah student movement.8 Another witness, who took active part in 
the management of universities after the revolution,9 explains that the 
conflict within campuses came to an end with the Cultural Revolution 
(1980-1983). The university system was under strong pressure as it was 
perceived to be a legacy of the former unwanted regime and some clerics 
saw it as posing a challenge to the religious seminaries (the Howzeh). As 
he put it: ‘The universities needed control. I was part of the delegation 
which exposed this problem to Khomeini: it was on that day that the 
Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat was born’. Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat-e Howzeh 
va Daneshgah (Office for the Strengthening of Unity between the Islamic 
Schools and the Universities, DTV) is an umbrella organisation whose 
central office coordinates all the Islamic associations in the individual 
universities. For many years to come it would constitute the main 
networking hub for politically active students whose engagement in 
politics took them beyond the world of the campus.10 
The delegation visiting Khomeini was composed of many soon-to-be main 
players in Iranian politics such as Seyyed Ali Khamene’i (the present 
Rahbar – Leader – of the Islamic Republic) and Abdol Hasan Bani Sadr. 
Bani Sadr became the first president of the Islamic Republic only to be 
deposed in 1981 and now lives in exile in Paris. Other members were: 
Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha, a leading cleric and founder of the 
Majma-e Rohaniyoun Mobarez, the Assembly of the Militant Clerics 
(the Islamic leftist group, supportive of President Khatami) and of the 
newspaper Salam; Mojtahed Shabestari, a pro-democracy reformist 
Ayatollah; Peiman Habibollah, a member of the Socialist Islamic Party 
who is today is an influential member of the Religious-Nationalist 
Alliance, an oppositional group outside of Iran; Hasan Habibi, a leading 
4.  In 1941, the Shah Reza 
Pahlavi was forced to 
abdicate by the Allies 
and an opening up of the 
political system occurred 
up until 1951-1953, when 
the coup against Mohammad 
Mossadeq and the restoration 
of the Pahlavi regime with 
the ascension to power of 
Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, took place. 
5.  Mohammad Reza Djalili, 
‘Les relations culturelles 
internationales de l’Iran’, 
Revue iranienne des relations 
internationales, no. 2, 
1974-75, pp. 107-26.
6.  Mark Graham and Shahram 
Khosravi, ‘Reordering 
Public and Private in Iranian 
Cyberspace: Identity, 
Politics, and Mobilization’, 
Identities: Global Studies 
in Culture and Power, vol. 
9, no. 2, 2002, p. 223.
7.  Reza Razavi, ‘The Cultural 
Revolution in Iran, with 
Close Regard to the 
Universities, and its Impact 
on the Student Movement’, 
Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 
45, no. 1, January 2009, p. 1.
8.  Personal interview with an 
Iranian leading politician, 
Tehran, June 2007. He held 
important institutional 
functions and headed a 
dissident semi-legal party, 
the Liberation Movement 
(Nehzat-e Azadi-ye Iran). 
Although seriously ill, he 
has been recently arrested.
9.  Personal interview with a 
leading Iranian politician, 
Tehran, May 2008. He 
was a founder-member 
of the Daftar-e Tahkim-e 
Vahdat and the Islamic 
Participation Front, which 
supported Khatami’s 
government. He was an 
advisor to Mehdi Karroubi 
in the 2009 presidential 
elections. A journalist at 
the newspaper Salam, he 
also writes for the online 
newspaper Rooz Online 
(www.roozonline.com). 
10.  Until 1993 only members 
of the Islamic associations 
elected the members of the 
central office. Since that 
date all students have been 
able to cast their vote.
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politician who served as Minister of Justice and vice-president in both 
the Rafsanjani and Khatami administrations (until 2001).
The group was not ideologically homogeneous, and it was Mousavi 
Khoeiniha who emerged as the dominant leader: he enjoyed many 
connections with the Islamic students’ groups, which is why the seizure 
of the US embassy in Tehran in November 1979 involved so many 
students.11 From that time on, up until the advent of Ahmadinejad, 
the cultural hegemony of the Islamic left was firmly established within 
universities and the DTV.
It was Khomeini who called for a cultural revolution, but many others 
echoed his words. Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Islamic leftist prime 
minister between 1981 and 1989 and later well-known reformist who 
accused Ahmadinejad of having stolen the 2009 election, stated that 
‘universities are not a place for professionals (motakhasses) but are a 
place for pious and engaged religious persons (maktabi) who at the same 
time are learning a profession (takhassus). We cannot accept anything 
other than to have a maktabi university.’12 In those early heady days of 
the Islamic Republic, Mousavi’s wife described the universities as ‘nests 
of spies, although she herself had headed the Al-Zahra University in 
Tehran for many years.13 The immediate practical consequence of these 
accusations was the closing down of all universities from 1980 until 
1983 and the Islamisation of the curricula and of the general atmosphere 
of the universities. 
In 1980, a special council, the Cultural Revolution Council, was 
established in order to implement this programme. Among the members 
of the council were Abdolkarim Soroush (the famous philosopher, who 
today stands accused by the conservatives of being Western-oriented) 
and Ali Khamene’i (currently Supreme Leader).14 The mission of the 
council was to supervise the Islamisation of the universities, which was 
accompanied by massive purges15 and the hiring of new ‘selected’ faculty 
members and the admission of new students. The Cultural Revolution 
still occupies an important place in the memories of the reformist 
and democratic students, the present-day members of the DTV. The 
youngest generation of activists defines those years as a ‘betrayal’ of 
the then revolutionary ideals of the students. The Cultural Revolution 
brought about a major change in the student population in universities. 
Facilities for students from lower-class backgrounds were introduced 
and, as a result of the faculty purges, a significant number of wealthy and 
upper-middle class families sent their sons and daughters to universities 
abroad or to the private Islamic Azad universities.16 The emphasis on 
religious adherence and moral rectitude as admission criteria, as well 
as the introduction of admission quotas for the children or relatives of 
war veterans and Basij (a volunteer militia force) members, changed the 
character of the student body both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
11.  Personal interview 
with a leading Iranian 
politician, Tehran, May 
2008 (see footnote 8).
12.  Razavi, op. cit. in 
note 7, p. 4.
13.  Ibid. 
14.  Other members were 
Mostafa Moin (former 
Minister of Science and 
staunch reformist, accused 
today of being too liberal 
by the conservatives) 
and Hassan Habibi.
15.  According to Abdolkarim 
Soroush, 700 out of 12,000 
professors and assistants 
were purged and some 
200,000 students were 
dismissed. See Matin 
Ghaffarian, One Cultural 
Revolution was enough: An 
Interview with Abdolkarim 
Soroush, June 2007: available 
at: www.drsoroush.com. 
Other sources give much 
higher figures, and put 
the number of assistants 
and professors purged at 
8,000; see Ali Aziminejadan 
cited in Razavi, op. 
cit. in note 7, p. 6. 
16.  The private Azad 
Universities were 
established in 1982 to 
offer an alternative to the 
public universities, which 
had been closed down. 
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The end of the war and Ayatollah Khomeini’s death helped a new era to 
take shape. At the political level, the Islamic left was pushed aside by 
the election of Hashemi Rafsanjani as President of the Republic and the 
nomination of Ayatollah Khamene’i as Supreme Leader of the Revolution. 
Both these men were hostile to the Islamic left. As the DTV, the only 
student organisation in the country, was strongly linked to the Islamic 
left, the government made great efforts to weaken it, by generating 
factionalism within the campus – a factionalism which mirrored the 
political divisions within the national political landscape. Student 
Basij units were introduced in universities and a new student group 
(the Islamic Association of the Student Basij)17 was established in 1992, 
under the auspices of the government. The creation of the student Basij 
units was accompanied by a law which introduced a special quota for 
student Basij members to enter universities. Furthermore, the Cultural 
Revolution Council passed new guidelines for choosing university 
councils and presidents. Under these new rules, Islamic leftist students 
were prevented from participating in such councils and influencing the 
nomination of the highest university functionaries, who decided on the 
legal status of student associations. A new office was also established, 
the Office of Representatives of the Supreme Leader, which had a 
permanent presence in universities.18 Reza Razavi also reports that 
voices were raised in favour of dismantling the DTV: its formation in 
the early days of the revolution had been designed to unite all Islamic 
groups within universities against the opposition, composed mainly 
of Marxist and liberal parties. Since by the 1990s the stability of the 
Islamic Republic was secured, some conservatives argued, the DTV’s 
existence made no sense and thus it should be dissolved.19
But the introduction from above of new student organisations had 
unintended consequences: instead of marginalising the DTV, it created 
a new configuration of political alternatives on the campus, since the 
DTV became more aware of its own distinctive identity and allegiances. 
Up to that moment, the Basij and the DTV were not ideologically very 
different, but the arrival of the former on the campuses led to the 
polarisation of the two organisations. According to a former student: 
‘We discovered our difference. The content of that difference was 
suggested in Dr. Soroush’s and Dr. Mohsen Kadivar’s lectures’.20 The 
presence of Abdolkarim Soroush among the lecturers of the University 
of Tehran is cited as one of the most important factors that helped to 
transform the DTV from a loyal ally of the regime into a critic of the 
regime’s increasing authoritarianism. It began to call for more democratic 
accountability and more freedom of expression. In 1997, these positions 
and its dependence upon the Islamic left, which was itself undergoing 
a transition from the intransigency of the past to a reformist stance, led 
the DTV to support Khatami’s presidential candidacy. This change can 
be seen as the result of a reaction of the young generation against the 
political models set by their predecessors. In the words of a political 
17.  The organisation was 
headed by Heshmatollah 
Tabarzadi, and later changed 
its name to the Union of 
Islamic Students. Tabarzadi 
broke with the DTV in 1991 
and established this group. 
The group also published a 
magazine, ‘Nameh-ye payam 
daneshjuy-e basij’ [‘The 
message of the Basij student’]. 
However, the group quickly 
developed increasingly 
critical positions towards 
the regime. Tabarzadi has 
been in jail since December 
2009. See Ali Akbar Mahdi, 
‘The Student Movement 
in the Islamic Republic 
of Iran’, Journal of Iranian 
Research and Analysis, vol. 
15, no. 2, 1999, p. 11.
18.  See ibid, pp. 8–11. 
19.  Reza Razavi, op. cit. 
in note 7, p. 9.
20.  Personal interview, Tehran, 
June 2007. Kadivar is an 
outspoken reformist cleric 
who now lives in exile 
in the United States.
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veteran of the Islamic Republic: ‘if the father is a monarchist, then the 
son is a radical Islamist, while the grandson is a liberal and a democrat’, 
suggesting a rather simplistic but effective dialectic that can explain the 
dynamics of change within Iranian society.21 But there is another element 
which explains the transformation of the DTV from a stronghold of the 
regime into one of its most vociferous critics, namely the introduction 
of free elections for the Central Committee in 1993. The whole student 
body chose the members of the Central Committee, and many restrictions 
on candidacy were abandoned. The DTV started to attract people with 
different views and opinions, becoming a relatively ‘free harbour for 
political activists,’ as one interviewee observed, moving away from its 
early ideological moorings, characterised by an uncritical loyalty to the 
Islamic left and later on to the reformists.22 
From a social point of view, at the beginning of the 1990s the Islamic 
Republic was confronted with tumultuous change. Having emerged 
from a decade of war, followed by the death of Khomeini, it now needed 
to find a way to reintegrate the international political and economic 
system. In this transition to a post-revolutionary society, the universities 
of the Islamic Republic lost their former homogeneity as the numbers 
of students in higher education increased: the students and faculties 
became more politically diversified, leading to internal diversification 
of student movements. In this regard the universities mirrored the 
broader transformation taking place in Iranian society. 
The number of students rose from 150,000 in 1976 to 1,150,000 in 
1996,23 and this exponential growth was to a large degree due to the 
increasing number of female students. This particular aspect became 
a source of concern for the conservatives, since it presented the DTV 
with new opportunities for recruitment. This increase in numbers 
was accompanied by a change in students’ attitudes towards politics 
and life in general. As Ahmad Rajabzadeh shows, in 2004 a decrease 
in traditional religious beliefs was detectable among the students, and 
a corresponding adherence to rationalism, a more scientific approach 
to life, began to prevail. In particular, the authority of the clergy to 
prescribe the correct interpretation of religion came under a great deal 
of criticism.24 
Universities are a space for the socialisation of beliefs and values. This 
can be a threat as well as an opportunity for ruling élites. The situation 
in the late 1990s was very similar to the pre-revolution context, when 
Mohammad Reza Shah expanded the higher education system. Although 
he thought he was initiating a process of building a new and loyal élite, in 
reality he was creating optimal conditions for an oppositional movement 
to develop. Similarly the expansion of higher education provided the 
reformists and the Islamic left with a good opportunity to strengthen 
the alliance with the students. When Mohammad Khatami inaugurated 
21.  Personal interview with 
a well-known journalist, 
Tehran, July 2008. He was 
editor-in-chief of many 
reformist newspapers and 
journals. He worked for 
the regime propaganda 
organisation in Beirut, 
Lebanon, between 1983 and 
1985. During Khatami’s 
presidency he was a 
supporter of the reforms 
and a vociferous critic of 
the authoritarian elements 
of the Iranian regime. 
22.  Personal interview with a 
former student and member 
of the central committee of 
the DTV, Tehran, May 2007.
23.  Mahdi, op. cit. in 
note 17, p. 14.
24.  Ahmad Rajabzadeh, 
‘University and Religion 
in Iran: A Survey on 
the State Universities of 
Tehran’, Discourse, vol. 5, 
no. 4, 2004, pp. 107-38.
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his campaign for the 1997 presidential election, whose keywords were 
‘democracy’, ‘civil society’ and ‘rule of law’, the students were urged 
to become actively involved through the DTV. Still dominant on the 
campuses, the DTV had undergone major internal changes caused by 
the massive influx of new members with different political viewpoints: 
this engendered its growing ambition to become independent from 
institutional politics, an unexpected development for the reformist 
governments.  
universities as the site of power and 
factional struggle
Khatami: promotion of and transformations in 
student activism
Reformist students have long played an active role in the factional 
politics of the Islamic Republic, supporting the Islamic left. Universities 
were a real stronghold of the reformists during Khatami’s first 
presidential term, and the DTV and Islamic associations of every 
university were transformed into electoral headquarters for the 
reformists during Khatami’s presidential campaign and the 2000 
parliamentary elections.25 For many, this showed that the DTV had 
never had any political independence to begin with.26 The reformist 
government headed by Khatami repaid this loyalty by giving favourable 
treatment to the DTV students and allowing the organisation a great 
deal of political visibility. Thus Khatami’s presidency represented a 
new opportunity for the DTV and student activism.27 
Khatami was central to the promotion of student activism both personally 
as well as by virtue of the importance of his office in the institutional 
governing of Iranian universities. As the head of the Council of the 
Cultural Revolution, the President supervises the nomination of university 
chancellors, the devising of curricula, the selection of student candidates, 
and finally promotes the ideological and political order on university 
campuses.  
But the alliance between the DTV and the reformist faction proved to 
be a precarious one. The first step towards a breakdown was the July 
1999 student protests, which were sparked by a factional dispute over 
newly passed amendments to the press law.28 Students considered the 
amendments, approved by a parliament dominated by the conservatives, 
to be yet another restriction on the freedom of speech and the press. 
Thus when Salam, one of the well-known Islamic-leftist newspapers, 
was closed down as a consequence of this new law, the students staged 
25.  See Mashayekhi, op. 
cit. in note 2, p. 296 
and following pages.
26.  The interviewees who were 
active members of the DTV 
supported such a view. The 
interviews were conducted 
in 2007 and 2008 in Iran, 
and in 2011 in Turkey.
27.   For an example of 
Khatami’s attitude toward 
university students, see the 
video of one of his visits 
to Tehran University in 
2002, where he was met 
with vociferous protests 
from angry students. 
The video is available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qrZw-yGlyTk.
28.  See Mahdi, op. cit. 
in note 17, pp. 13 and 
following pages.
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a peaceful protest. The protest was followed by a bloody attack by 
paramilitary forces (among which Ansar-e Hezbollah and sections of the 
Basij) on the student dormitory in Amirabad in Tehran. Several people 
are known to have been killed and many wounded, but precise figures 
are not available.29 The students asked Khatami to support them, but he 
described the protests as ‘an attack on national security.’30 Many within 
the reformist front shared this attitude, probably because they feared an 
uncontrolled escalation of violence.31 The dormitory incident occupies 
a special place in the memories of Iranian students, as it generated a 
profound feeling of betrayal. The incident also constitutes a precedent 
for the latest attacks against the students’ dormitories that took place in 
2009. It led to a major debate on the role of students in politics, although 
the DTV’s membership in Dovvom-e Khordad, the coalition that was 
created to support the reformist candidate at the 2000 parliamentary 
election, delayed a standoff with the regime somewhat.32
In 2002, however, the debate led to the splitting of the DTV into two 
branches and the severing of ties with Dovvom-e Khordad. The Allameh 
branch, the majority, advocated an independent democratic opposition 
to the conservatives ‘from below’, within society and outside institutions, 
whereas the Shiraz minority branch joined the conservative camp. The 
Allameh students were determined to act as a sort of ‘watchdog’ and 
counterbalance to the government, because they judged the government 
to be unable to foster a path to democracy for Iran.33 They set up a number 
of special commissions to establish collaboration with organisations 
outside the universities, such as women’s NGOs and the bus drivers’ 
trade union for example: according to the students, an extra-institutional 
alliance of citizens and ‘civil society’ was much more likely to usher in 
the much awaited transition to democracy.34
This independent attitude and critical stance was not welcomed by the 
reformists, who accused the students of being manipulated by foreign 
powers – a heinous accusation in Iran.35 The DTV brought this conflict 
into the public arena, and was marginalised and excluded by the very 
same government it had supported. To borrow the metaphor of one 
reformist politician and former leader of the DTV, the students were 
‘swept away like grains of sand, no longer protected by the desert’:36 
factionalism was the only approved model for governing university 
campuses and the student movement, and the DTV’s independent 
attitude was interpreted as a betrayal and an unacceptable option, 
eventually leading to their marginalisation. 
Thus, one of the outcomes of the shifting relationship between Khatami’s 
government and the DTV was the disintegration of the unity of the 
students: hit by ‘friendly fire’, the DTV broke up into several smaller 
groups which spanned a broad ideological spectrum, ranging from 
conservatism, as in the Shiraz group, to radical liberalism.37 The 
29.  Hamshahri reported 5 
dead, 11 July 1999.
30.  Neshat, 28 July 1999. 
Charles Kurzman, ‘Student 
Protests and the Stability 
of Gridlock in Khatami’s 
Iran’, Journal of South Asian 
and Middle Eastern Studies, 
XXV, 1, 2001, p. 41.
31.  Khordad, 8 June 1999. 
Behzad Nabavi, a reformist 
deputy, accused the 
students of creating 
confusion in the country.
32.  ‘Jarian-e Daneshjuian, 
chaleshha va rahkarha. 
Goftogu ba Ali Tajrania’ 
[‘Student movement, 
challenges and 
solutions. A discussion 
with Ali Tajrania’], 
Cheshmandaz-e Iran, no. 
26 (1383/2004), p. 190.
33.  Personal interview 
with a member of the 
DTV, Tehran, 2008. 
34.  Personal interview with a 
female student member of 
the Special Commission for 
Women within the DTV, 
Tehran, 2008. See also the 
magazine Gozaar, no. 11, 
2007 (www.gozaar.org).
35.  Mehdi Karroubi had 
done likewise in 2003, 
when the DTV organised 
protests against a hike 
in tuition fees. Islamic 
Republic News Agency 
(IRNA), 16 June 2003. 
36.  Personal interview 
with a leading Iranian 
politician, Tehran, May 
2008 (see footnote 8). 
37.  Such as the association of 
liberal students (anjoman-e 
daneshjuian liberal), still 
active in Iran. It is not 
recognised as a lawful 
student organisation. 
Its website is: http://
cheragheazadi.org. Some 
of its members are among 
the 19 activists who signed 
a letter calling for isolating 
the Islamic Republic 
(see below, note 66). 
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government’s determination to force the DTV to submit to a factional-
reformist allegiance led the student organisation to exit from the political 
game altogether. Ironically, this was a great boon to Ahmadinejad’s efforts 
to bring the universities to heel, and detrimental to the reformists who 
lost an important support base. 
After Ahmadinejad’s ascension to the presidency in 2005 the campuses 
again turned into battlefields between the pro-government students 
(mainly organised in Basij units) and the opposition student groups 
(brought together in the DTV-Allameh and other minor forces). The 
repression of reformist students and the promotion of Basij units in turn 
led to the strengthening of connections between these marginalised 
students and external reformist organisations (women’s movements, 
workers’ movements etc.) 
The oppressive atmosphere is best described by the students themselves: 
many of them underline the fact that the youngest students now feared 
to be seen with activists, to such an extent that even to ‘have a chat 
is thought of as too dangerous.’38 Thanks to governmental support, 
being a Basij is seen as a more rewarding and opportune option than 
engaging in opposition activities. This altered political landscape on the 
campuses does not mean that the spirit of dissent among the students 
has disappeared: only that it has moved underground, or outside the 
country. 
ahmadinejad: universities as a means to attain 
domination
Regimes and governments of all sorts employ a variety of means to shape 
the political identity of future citizens while they are still students. In 
the Ahmadinejad era this means that the student Basij units receive 
financial and political help enabling them to become stronger and 
bigger. When the student Basij units were first created their functions 
were diverse and consisted mainly of welcoming the new students and 
performing other ‘representational’ duties. Their task was to control 
and contain the DTV as well, but until Khatami’s victory in 1997 they 
were not endowed with a role beyond the confines of the universities. 
It was only after the rise and strengthening of the reform movement 
that the Basij units became an operational tool in the hands of the 
conservatives to suppress active reformist groups. The Basij presence on 
campuses was then reinforced by a law passed in 1998, which changed 
the Basij units into a military institution and allowed the presence of 
military units in the universities.39 This ‘new’ role of the Basij units 
became even clearer during the suppression of the student protests in 
July 1999. Since the late 1990s, some new regulations for Basij units in 
universities have been adopted. For example, 40 percent of the total 
number of places for new students entering the universities every year 
38.  Personal interview with 
a former member of the 
DTV, Tehran, August-
September 2008.
39.  A move which, according 
to one of the author’s 
interviewees, was supported 
by Said Hajjarian, a former 
member of the Institute 
of Security and Strategic 
Research and a leader of the 
reformists who, in 1992, 
launched the ‘Security 
Plan’, whose purpose was to 
prevent a possible uprising 
and protests emanating from 
the DTV and Iranian society 
in general. The student Basij 
units within the universities 
had this function. Hajjarian 
is close to Rafsanjani. This 
information was revealed in 
a personal interview with 
a former member of the 
DTV central committee, 
Tehran, May 2008.
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have been reserved for active Basij students. At the national level, the 
Student Basij Organisation has grown substantially in recent years: in 
2004, the student Basij in Iranian universities numbered some 420,000, 
and by 2007 they had increased to 600,000.40 These developments have 
changed the student population. In the state universities, it was only 
after 2005 that the special quota for Basij was introduced.
The establishment of the Basij in the universities has been important to 
Ahmadinejad and conservatives in the post-Khatami era since they are 
a key instrument for challenging the reformists’ domination over the 
campuses and for suppressing opposition and student dissent. During 
Ahmadinejad’s first presidential term (2005-2009) there was talk of a 
projected second cultural revolution, as the government moved to enforce 
Islamic values and purge universities of ‘liberal’ and ‘Western’ views, 
introduced thanks to the ‘moral lasciviousness’ of the ‘Rafsanjanists’ and 
reformists. The Basij units were at the forefront of that project, enjoying 
some related privileges (e.g. a special university admissions quota, discounts 
on books and food, access to sports facilities, pilgrimages, travel and 
entertainment),41 enticements which especially appeal to students (both 
male and female) from poor and conservative families, whose aspirations 
to social mobility may, in this way, come to be realised. 
Thus after Ahmadinejad’s election, the DTV was explicitly targeted by the 
government who prevented it from organising the election for the Central 
Committee or from organising its own meetings, which eventually were 
held off campus.42 Active student groups were now only tolerated if they 
had pro-government credentials and the subsequent political vacuum 
left by the DTV was mainly filled by the Basij. Some Marxist and liberal 
student groups were also present in universities, although they were 
rather small and had been only recently been set up. As Babak Zamanian 
has stated, ‘while the situation had not been ideal in the Khatami years, 
Mr. Ahmadinejad’s anti-reformist campaign … led students to value 
their previous freedoms.’43 In 2005 the newly appointed dean of the 
Polytechnic, Alireza Rahai, ordered the demolition of the office of the 
Islamic Association, the pro-reform group which was the core of political 
activities on campus. According to students interviewed in 2006, since 
2005 more than 100 liberal professors have been forced into retirement, 
at least 70 students have been suspended for political activities, and some 
30 students have been given warnings.44 Obviously these numbers have 
increased further in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections.
This ‘second cultural revolution’, as it was swiftly dubbed, has seen 
the firing or forced retirement of teachers regarded as having liberal 
sympathies and the removal of activists from the universities. The banning 
of students is also known as the ‘starring of students’ because the files 
of students with activist backgrounds are rated according to a scale of 
one to three stars, with students assigned three stars being barred from 
40.  Saeid Golkar, ‘The Reign 
of Hard-line Students in 
Iran’s Universities. How 
the Student Basij Serve 
the Regime’s Purposes’, 
Middle East Quarterly, vol. 
17, no. 3, 2010, p. 26.
41.  See also Ali Reza Eshraghi, 
‘Iranian students fight 
hard and soft’, Asia Times 
Online, 2 July 2010.
42.  Personal communication 
with a student who escaped 
from Iran, March 2011. The 
last general election of the 
Central Committee of the 
DTV was held electronically, 
through the internet, in 
2010. According to two of 
the members of this last 
Central Committee, the 
election was not conducted 
according to the rules. These 
two former members have 
left the country, and are 
today living abroad. Personal 
interview, July 2011. 
43.  Babak Zamanian, quoted 
in Nazila Fathi’s article, 
is a former member of the 
DTV’s Central Committee 
and student at the Amir 
Kabir Polytechnic. See 
Nazila Fathi, ‘Iran President 
facing revival of students’ 





entering university education. This is a well-known practice, which has 
been denied by the government, although the issue has been openly 
debated in the media.45 Those who are ‘starred’ are not able to pursue their 
enrolment in universities (or to continue their education) because their 
files are said to be ‘incomplete,’ as the Central Selection Committee of the 
University and the Ministry of Science prefer to use the term ‘incomplete 
file’ rather than ‘starred student.’46 Those who find themselves in such a 
situation are given the opportunity to be re-integrated into the academic 
community through abjuration. They have to sign a letter of regret, and 
can then register conditionally. The goal of the government is to chasten 
and to punish ‘bad’ students, not primarily to exclude them, and in this 
case bureaucracy rather than overt repression is used to obtain students’ 
compliance. The practice of starring students is the result of a ‘security-
driven’ use of bureaucracy, and is a good indicator of the degree of collusion 
between the Security and Information Ministry and the universities. The 
real reason for their exclusion, and eventually in some cases expulsion, is 
not clearly communicated to the students, although those excluded know 
why they are in this predicament (because of their political activities or 
‘incorrect’ religious behaviour). As reported by the International Campaign 
for Human Rights in Iran, university staff mainly express a sense of 
powerlessness or at best moderate solidarity with the students in this 
situation.47 But this exclusionary practice is not the only tool used by the 
regime to bring university students to heel: recruitment and factionalism 
are other tools used to control the campuses. An examination of these 
latter issues can help towards a better understanding of the origins and 
evolution of domestic conflicts in Iran.
universities as the recruitment pool of competing 
state elite factions
The elite system of the Islamic Republic is characterised by strong 
factionalism, whose boundaries have shifted over the years, and whose 
origins may often be traced back to political allegiances forged by 
politicians when they were student activists.48 Retracing a politician’s 
past is useful for understanding their political frame of reference as well 
as their actions; furthermore, this kind of analysis may be of great help 
when factional disputes emerge, as it can clarify individual political 
loyalties and stances. There are networks of ‘special connections’ within 
the system of the Islamic Republic, which forge political identities. A 
case in point is the inter-connectedness of politics, universities and 
the military sector by means of the Basij and Sepah-e Pasdaran, the 
revolutionary guards. This relation is not particular to Ahmadinejad’s 
era; the link between the intelligence service, the Sepah-e Pasdaran and 
the Basij – which are today one military corps – has been a constant 
feature of the political history of the Islamic Republic. It is in the ranks 
of these organisations that many present-day politicians started their 
careers.
45.  In 2007-2008, Iranian 
newspapers debated the 
issue at length. See Punishing 
Stars: Systematic Denial of 
Higher Education in Iran, 
International Campaign 
for Human Rights in Iran 
(ICHRI), 2011, pp. 41-51. 
46.  Ibid, p. 22. According to 
the ICHRI report, this has 
been happening since 2009.
47.  ICHRI (2011), p. 37. In 
October 2011, the Science 
Minister Kamran Daneshjoo 
announced that students who 
participated in the post-2009 
election protests will not 
receive any grant or financial 
help for studying. ‘Protesters 
Won’t Get Grants: Iran’s 
Minister of Science’, Payvand 
News, 24 October 2011.  
48.  See Bahman Bakhtiari, 
Parliamentary Politics in 
Revolutionary Iran. The 
Institutionalisation of 
Factional Politics (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 
1996): ‘factionocracy’ is a 
fluid quasi-party system, 
where loyalty and belonging 
are defined by many aspects, 
not only ideological; Mehdi 
Moslem, Factional Politics in 
Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 
2002); and Farideh Farhi’s 
chapter in this Chaillot Paper.
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From an historical point of view, membership of the Sepah-e-Pasdaran or 
the Basij should not be understood as a clear sign of a pro-Ahmadinejad 
or conservative political orientation. For instance, in the first decade 
after the revolution, the (para)military sector was strongly influenced 
by the Islamic left – which turned reformist in the 1990s. This is 
because these institutions are central to the whole system and have 
been conceived as a shared political lineage across the political spectrum 
of the Islamic Republic for many years. Nevertheless, today they are 
influenced by pro-Ahmadinejad forces. But their main loyalty is to the 
Rahbar, Khamenei, as the recent disputes between Ahmadinejad and 
Khamenei have shown.
Among Ahmadinejad’s collaborators, it is easy to find persons who 
have a past in the ranks of the Basij and Pasdaran serving on university 
campuses. This is the case for Alireza Zakani, a parliamentary deputy 
and former head of the Student Basij Organisation, the coordinating 
authority of all the student Basij units.49 Mehrdad Bazrpash is the former 
head of the Basij unit at Sharif University of Technology and was the 
Head of the National Youth Organisation until October 2010.50 A rather 
interesting case is that of Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, who is considered 
one of Ahmadinejad’s closest collaborators and friends. He organised 
and managed Ahmadinejad’s 2009 electoral campaign, was appointed 
as deputy Interior Minister in 2007 (a key position for the supervision 
of electoral procedures) and has numerous relatives and close friends 
who have been awarded government appointments. Mohamad Javad 
Bahonar, an experienced deputy and former Speaker of the Parliament, is 
Samareh’s maternal uncle. Samareh’s two brothers also have important 
posts in the Ministry of Oil and Energy.51 He is very close to the ultra-
conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, who has been 
seen as Ahmadinejad’s mentor and who advocated the use of violence 
to suppress the reform movement in the 1990s.52 The relation between 
Ahmadinejad and Samareh is a primus inter pares relationship. In the 
past, Samareh helped the President with his political career, and now 
Ahmadinejad is returning the favour. Like Ahmadinejad, Samareh 
studied at Tehran’s University of Science and Technology (popularly 
known as Elm-o Sanat), where the two started their shared history of 
engagement and activism. In the first student national election in 1979 
Samareh was elected as the first representative from Elm-o Sanat, and 
Ahmadinejad as his deputy.53 
There are close links between the Tehran University of Science and 
Technology and Ahmadinejad’s government, and there is a high 
concentration of its alumni among the president’s entourage. They include 
many ministers of the current presidential cabinet: Ali Akbar Salehi, 
who lectured at Elm-o Sanat, former head of the Iranian Atomic Energy 
Organisation, is the current Minister of Foreign Affairs.54 He also served 
for many years as the Chancellor of the Sharif University of Technology, 
49.  Zakani became famous as 
he criticised Ahmadinejad’s 
harsh repression of the 
protests in December 2009.
50.  Golkar, op. cit. in 
note 40, p. 26.
51.  Muhammad Sahimi, 
‘Ahmadinejad and Family 
take on “new” Foreign 
Policy’, Tehran Bureau, 
2 September 2009.
52.  Wilfried Buchta, Who 
Rules Iran? The Structure 
of Power in the Islamic 
Republic (Washington D.C.: 
Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 2000), pp. 
162, 168. See also Babak 
Ganji, ‘Iranian Strategy: 
Factionalism and Leadership 
Politics’, Defence Analysis 
of the United Kingdom, 
London 2007, p. 7.
53.  Interview with a leading 
politician (see footnote 8).
54.  Salehi’s loyalty to 
Ahmadinejad is evidenced 
by the position the Minister 
took in the context of the 
recent dispute between 
Ahmadinejad and Khamene’i 
– and in particular on the 
occasion of the dismissal 
of the Deputy Foreign 
Minister Mohammad Sharif 
Malekzadeh. See Najmeh 
Bozorgmehr, ‘Iranian 
deputy foreign minister 
dismissed’, Financial 
Times, 21 June 2011.  
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the most prestigious technological university in Tehran. Mehdi Ghazanfari 
is the Minister of Commerce, Industries and Mines, Ali Akbar Mehrabian 
was the Minister of Mines as well as being Ahmadinejad’s nephew,55 and 
Hamid Behbehani, a lecturer in transportation at Tehran’s University of 
Science and Technology, was Ahmadinejad’s mentor at university and 
Minister of Transportation. Behbehani was impeached by the Majlis 
in February 2011. The move against the Minister was endorsed by the 
Expediency Council too. Since Ahmadinejad is close to the impeached 
minister and the Expediency Council is headed by Rafsanjani, many 
have seen this dispute as a reflection of the rivalry between Rafsanjani 
and the current president. 56 
Among Khatami’s collaborators, too, many received their political 
education within the ranks of the Sepah-e Pasdaran or revolutionary 
nezam (system). These included the following: Akbar Ganji, a dissident 
journalist, who today lives in the United States, and who is one of the 
most well-known figures of the dissident Iranian diaspora; Mohsen 
Armin, a leading member of the Mojahedin of the Islamic revolution, a 
radical-Islamic leftist faction turned reformist faction, who is currently 
in jail; Mohsen Sazegara, a well-known dissident who was a leading 
politician in Iran and a close collaborator of Mousavi during the first 
decade after the revolution – he supported Khatami’s government but 
in 2003 he moved to Europe and later the United States, and currently 
collaborates with a number of dissident websites and newspapers; Said 
Hajjarian, who was a key figure in the security apparatus of the Islamic 
Republic, before becoming the most influential strategist in the reformist 
camp. He survived an assassination attempt in the year 2000 but was 
left paralysed. In the aftermath of the presidential elections in June 
2009 he was imprisoned. Ganji, Hajjarian, Armin and Sazegara were 
among the founders and leading commanders of the Sepah-e Pasdaran 
during the 1980s and 1990s 
Later, as a result of the change in the domestic political scene during the 
1990s, many turned to the world of culture, journalism and academia.57 
The strength of the link between institutional politics and student activism 
within the Islamic leftist-reformist circles is also demonstrated by the 
DTV’s membership of the Dovvom-e Khordad Front. After the reformists 
won the election, the Mosharekat party, Khatami’s party, supported the 
establishment of a ‘student faction’ within the sixth Parliament (2000–
2004). This faction was headed by Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeini and several 
members were former DTV leaders,58 who stood as reformist candidates 
in the 2000 election and were subsequently banned from standing for 
re-election in 2004 by the Guardian Council.59
The above-described cases illustrate how factionalism within the 
institutions originates in universities, underlining the centrality of this 
institution to a deeper understanding of Iranian politics. But factionalism 
55.  Mehrabian lost his portfolio 
to Ghazanfari when the 
two ministries (Mines on 
the one side, and Industries 
and Commerce on the 
other) were unified. See 
‘Ahmadinejad chahar vazir 
pishnahady-e khodra 
beh Majlis mo’arefi kard’ 
[Ahmadinejad presented his 
four proposed ministers], 




See also Ali Alfoneh, ‘All 
Ahmadinejad’s Men’, 
Middle East Quarterly, 
Spring 2011, p. 83.
56.  See Kayvan Bozorgmehr, 
‘Expediency Council Issues 
a Warning to Ahmadinejad 
after he Disregards Even 
Impeachment’, Rooz Online 
via Payvand News, 7 
February 2011, available at 
http://www.payvand.com.
57.  This is the case for people 
such as Abbas Abdi, 
Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, 
Hamid Jalaipour, Hashemi 
Aghajari and Said Hajjarian, 
who became intellectuals 
closely associated with 
reformist political circles 
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system of propaganda and 
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after the revolution. They 
all share a long history 
of engagement in student 
activism and universities.
58.  Among them were 
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Tajernia, Meisam Saidi 
and Reza Yusefian.
59.  See the presentation of the 
student faction at the first 
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Islamic Iran’s Participation 
Front, Nameh-ye Komiteh 
Daneshjuy Jebhe Mosharekat 
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IIPF], Ta Kongre dovvom. 
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[Proceedings of the First 
National Convention of the 
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Front], 2000, pp. 30-32.
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is not only the outcome of the way universities are governed, it is also 
adopted as the model for governing universities. This is the case of the 
governmental efforts to control the private Azad universities: another 
battlefield where the political factional dispute has recently moved. 
The Azad universities were established in 1982 and today have more 
than a million fee-paying students all over the country. They were 
established by Hashemi Rafsanjani, towards whom both the Supreme 
Leader Khamene’i and the President are hostile for many reasons, the 
most recent being that Rafsanjani is suspected of being a supporter of 
the Green Movement.60 Since the summer of 2010 a factional struggle 
has developed to gain control of the assets of the Azad universities: 
Ahmadinejad has repeatedly denounced the management of the Azad 
Universities as corrupt and immoral. At the height of the dispute, which 
was reached in late June 2010, Khamene’i stepped in too, indicating 
the importance of the struggle.61 
The factional struggle between the ‘Rafsanjanists’ and moderate 
conservatives versus the government revolved around Rafsanjani’s 
announcement that the Azad universities were to be converted into a 
religious endowment – making the Azad universities a totally private 
institution, theoretically immune from governmental control – and 
the issue of who has the power to nominate the next Chancellor. 
The incumbent, Abdallah Jasbi, has been a member of the traditional 
conservative Islamic Coalition Society, which supported Rafsanjani’s 
presidential candidature in 2005, and backed Mousavi’s candidacy 
in 2009. Khamene’i’s intervention has on the one hand thwarted 
Ahmadinejad’s ambition to control the Board of Trustees and the 
appointment of the Chancellor,62 but on the other hand prevented 
Rafsanjani from transforming the Azad University’s properties into 
an endowment, leaving the door open for Ahmadinejad to try another 
assault. If, as many believe, Khamene’i’s move aims to reinforce the 
image of a Leader who keeps the system and factions in balance,63 the 
whole controversy proves the central importance of the university as 
a ‘war chest’ for Khamene’i and his circle. It also indicates the lengths 
to which elite factions are prepared to go in order to achieve their 
ambitions – by reproducing the factional structure of the political sphere 
on the university compuses.
60.  See Nazanin Kamdar, 
‘Iran’s Azad University, 
Coming Battleground 
Against Rafsanjani’, Rooz 
Online, 5 October 2010.
61.  Payan-e ghole-ye daneshgah 
Azad bah nameh-ye rahbari?, 
Rah-e Sabz, 13 tir 1389 [4 
July 2010]. See also Babak, 
‘The Battle over Islamic Azad 
University’, Foreign Policy, 
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Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
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Hassan Habibi, Hasan 
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politics from abroad? the post-2009 
electoral crisis, migration and regime 
stability
Ahmadinejad’s policy of containing student activism and clamping 
down on anti-government organisations on university campuses has 
achieved its goals, namely the effective exclusion of democratic-reformist 
student activism. Those who attempt to continue engaging in such 
activism are expelled from the universities. But even prior to this recent 
policy, going back to 2002, the students’ increased estrangement from 
institutional politics has been compensated by their proximity to other 
social forces. The reformist student movement has networked outside 
the campus in order to reach out to society at large, beyond the state-
controlled institutions, and build a social movement strong enough to 
lead a democratic transition: as one student has put it, ‘our idea was 
that Khatami’s government couldn’t lead the country to democracy. The 
students must therefore create a social movement in order to achieve 
that.’64 
Almost ten years later, the 2009 protests have proven that universities are 
no longer the pulsating heart of the political struggle that they were in 
July 1999. ‘It is fair to say that the 2009 protests were more broad-based. 
In fact the protests didn’t start in the universities. Although students 
constituted an important segment of the movement, they were not its 
vanguard.’65 Contrary to what happened in 1999, when the students were 
at the core of the protests and were leading them, in 2009 the student 
movement proved to be alive, but also to be divided into small and 
poorly organised groups.66 On the one hand, this has allowed students 
to dissociate themselves from factionalism, and they have been able to 
enjoy more independence and revitalise the campuses politically. On 
the other hand, the pro-democratic students are handicapped by the fact 
that they have no direct links to the institutional politics of the Islamic 
Republic, since all the most important reformist figures are today either 
under arrest, serving jail sentences or have fled abroad.67 
This situation has furthermore created unsafe conditions and very 
weak political protection for activists: due to this, many have decided 
to leave Iran. The process leading to this decision follows an established 
path: arrest, detention, lack of money and employment, or expulsion 
from university. In such circumstances emigration appears as the 
logical option, all the more so as it is now part of the Iranian collective 
psyche due to the historical experience of emigration. According 
to the statistics of the Iranian Refugees’ Alliance, in 2009 almost 
16,000 Iranians applied for asylum worldwide and in 2010 they 
64.  Personal interview with a 
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for Women within the 
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65.  Personal interview with 
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left Iran, March 2011.
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were 19,000.68 In 2010, some 6,700 Iranians had applied for asylum 
in EU Member States,69 where some 150,000 Iranian refugees and 
asylum-seekers are already living.70 The numbers are even higher in 
Turkey, where Iranians can immigrate illegally with a smaller amount 
of money and where they constitute the highest number of asylum 
applicants; unofficial statistics estimate the number of Iranians 
currently living in Turkey as somewhere between 200,000 and 
500,000.71 Generally, those leaving Iran are well-educated, politically 
active and young.72 The question is whether such a huge population 
abroad will act in the same way as did the Iranian student diaspora 
during the reign of the Shah, when it played an important role in 
drawing international attention to the situation in Iran, or whether 
the recent exodus will simply end up impoverishing the ranks of 
the internal opposition, condemning Iran to become a closed and 
stagnant society. It would be naïve to assume that the majority of 
young Iranians abroad are willing to continue their past political 
engagement;73 but considering the special relationship of student 
politics to factionalism and the centrality of their ‘home institution,’ 
namely the university, to national debate, they could be important 
voices for the international community to pay attention to as an 
indicator of emerging political trends.
The probability of such an outcome depends on the feasibility of a 
united opposition front to the Islamic Republic being established. In 
this regard, there are some distinctive characteristics of the Iranian 
exilic diaspora that must be taken into consideration. Because of an 
often overly-simplistic depiction of the context of the post-2009 electoral 
crisis, there is a common perception that all Iranians, whether in exile 
or not, are activists or anti-regime oriented. Although the vast majority 
of Iranians residing abroad and seeking asylum are very critical of the 
regime, not all among them are activists nor do they necessarily see 
political engagement as their priority for the future. 
In fact many are just looking for opportunities to study and build a 
professional career abroad, where they can enjoy better conditions and 
fewer social restrictions. Many others are preoccupied with claiming 
their rights as asylum-seekers or refugees, as this is their most immediate 
need. In the case of asylum seekers, in some cases they may pretend 
to be much more active than they actually were back home in Iran, 
since political asylum ensures the applicants with social and economic 
aid – unlike the conditions endured by ‘ordinary’ migrants who are not 
legally entitled to any special treatment.74 
Apart from the question of individual political commitment, the 
diversification of the Iranian opposition in exile and the many conflicts 
between the existing groups make the establishment of a credible and 
united voice difficult. The success of ‘pressure from abroad’ is conditioned 
68.   Iranian Refugees’ Alliance, 
‘Statistical Sheet: Statistical 
Data on Iranian Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees in 
2009’, 2009. Available 
at www.irainc.org. 
69.  Iranian Refugees’ Alliance, 
‘Statistical Data On Iranian 
Refugees and asylum 
seekers’, 2011, available 
at http://www.irainc.org/
iranref/statistics.php. See 
also Anthony Albertinelli, 
‘Asylum applicants and 
first instance decisions 
on asylum applications in 
Q1 2010’, Eurostat Data 
in Focus, 32/2010, p. 6.
70.  Sebnem Koser Akcapar 
estimates the number 
of Iranians in European 
countries or North America 
in 2003 at 132,544. See S. 
K. Akcapar, ‘Rethinking 
migrants’ networks and 
social capital: a case-study 
of Iranians in Turkey’, 
International Migration, vol. 
48, no. 2, 2010, p. 165.
71.  Ibid, pp. 163-64. 
72.  OMID Advocates for 
Human Rights, Report on the 
situation of Iranian Refugees 
in Turkey. Post June 12th 
2009: one year later, Berkeley, 
June 2010, pp. 11-15. 
73.   This is one of the 
conclusions of the author’s 
ongoing fieldwork in Italy 
(since March 2010) and 
Turkey (July and August, 
November 2011).
74.  This has been widely 
observed during the 
fieldwork undertaken by 
the author in Italy (since 
May 2010) and Turkey (July, 
August and November 2011). 
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on access to political circles in the country of residence for the various 
Iranian groups in exile. Achieving such access, however, does not 
necessarily reflect or engender real influence or appreciation inside Iran. 
Groups are often at odds with each other both for ideological reasons and 
due to competition for political credibility or governments’ attention. 
Another pressing structural problem among the different strands of the 
Iranian opposition abroad is the lack of reciprocal trust; this is weak 
even among single individuals who participate in oppositional activities. 
Several cases of secret agents sent by the Islamic Republic to infiltrate 
groups and associations have been reported. Spreading false news in 
order to create confusion and destroy the credibility of outspoken critics 
of the Islamic Republic is one of the techniques used by the regime in 
order to weaken the opposition. 
Despite these constraints, the exodus of young Iranians who have left 
the country in the past few years may profoundly refashion the political 
landscape of the Iranian opposition abroad. A sense of solidarity with, 
and support for, the Green Movement is shared by all the Iranian political 
groups in exile. Efforts made by some associations, whose constituency 
originates in student politics, to re-unite the different strands of the 
Iranian opposition are an important step in the direction of establishing a 
credible voice that can be taken seriously by the international community. 
Activists share a common past in the ranks of the Green Movement, and 
are linked through political activities or membership in organisations 
since the time they lived in Iran. These connections can be maintained 
thanks to access to technologies which are forbidden in the Islamic 
Republic. In particular, many political refugees or asylum-seekers 
who actively supported one of the two reformist candidates in the last 
presidential elections, and who were prominent in reformists’ political 
circles and in the media, still represent a crucial reference point for many 
of the activists outside Iran.75 Furthermore, the sharing of common 
difficulties linked to their legal status as asylum-seekers and refugees 
reinforces their sense of solidarity: it does not, however, mean that the 
various groups have overcome their ideological differences thanks to 
the common experience of exile.76
conclusion
Student politics is a crucial sphere that deserves the careful attention of 
Iran analysts: understanding what is going on within university campuses 
allows a much broader perspective on Iran’s domestic politics and its 
factional conflicts. Factional conflicts appear more comprehensible 
when individual connections and political allegiances, which often date 
back to the various actors’ past as university students, are taken into 
75.  This is attested by the role 
played by the websites 
Jaras (Rah-e sabz), The 
Green Voice of Freedom, 
Rooz Online, Zadio 
Zamaneh, and the like.
76.  For example, this is the 
case of the organisation 
called Hambastegi faollin 
tabhidi (Solidarity among 
activists in exile), whose 
call for solidarity and 
participation has appealed 
to diversified strands of 
Iranian oppositional groups 
abroad. Recently, the Green 
Congress of the Democrats 
(Kongres demokrasi 
khandan-e sabz) is also 
playing an interesting role, 
connecting individuals and 
groups from ideologically 
diverse backgrounds.
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consideration. This is especially true in the case of an authoritarian 
regime such as Iran, where educational institutions have a particularly 
important role in maintaining ideological and cultural hegemony. 
Many Iranian politicians were student activists in their youth and it is 
no coincidence that the universities have always been one of the first 
places to be ‘colonised’ by ‘new’ powers when major political upheavals 
(such as the revolution itself, Khomeini’s death and the end of the war, 
Khatami’s election and later Ahmadinejad’s) have taken place. This has 
been the case throughout Iran’s post-revolutionary history, regardless 
of the ideological orientation of these ‘new’ powers. 
Observing the situation on the campuses makes it easier to gauge the 
state of play with regard to factional struggles and to gain a clearer 
understanding of domestic politics. But universities are important as 
sites of rights advocacy and contestation as well. Keeping a focus on the 
university campuses means being able to assess the political domestic 
situation in terms of the prospects for social peace or conflict, the 
likelihood of change, and the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
current politics of an important segment of the country’s population. 
Given the current situation and the large numbers of Iranians who have 
been leaving the country in recent years, communities residing abroad 
are increasing in size and political relevance. Although it is important to 
recognise and acknowledge the differences among the various strands 
and groups of the opposition, some interesting efforts to reunite Iranians 
residing abroad are currently taking place. It is of great importance that 
such experiments are supported since they could, in time, nurture the 
emergence of a fresh and reliable Iranian political voice that needs to 
be taken into consideration by Western policy-makers. 
In the case of Iran, student politics has often been regarded as synonymous 
with dissidence and perceived as intimately bound up with other salient 
issues, such as the building of the Islamic state (since the universities 
were among the first institutions to be Islamised with the cooperation 
of the student associations), the reformists’ effort to ‘democratise’ Iran, 
or Ahmadinejad’s recent authoritarian entrenchment. With the election 
of Khatami in 1997 the perspective on student activism changed and 
the students were seen as harbingers of a democratisation process, 
which conformed to the general perception of student activism as 
inherently progressive.  As evidenced in this chapter, this over-emphasis 
on democratisation has prevented analysts from explaining how the 
dynamics of student politics might be connected to, and interact with, 
the institutional framework of the Islamic Republic. In order to make 
sense of the role of universities and student activism in Iran they should 
thus be viewed as organically (in a Gramscian sense) connected to the 
ideological and political system of the Islamic Republic.
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As this chapter has made clear, universities lie at the heart of politics 
in the Islamic Republic, having a significance that goes beyond specific 
trends of democratisation (or lack thereof), and revealing important 
features of the wider political environment such as factionalism, resource 
distribution and élite selection.
The rifts within Iranian society and the factionalism that characterises 
its elite and pervades the state bureaucracies will hence continue to 
play themselves out on the campuses of Iranian universities. In this 
students are both actors and victims, and their actions and reactions 
cannot necessarily be understood in terms of schematic progressive 
versus reactionary dichotomies.
